Agreements made by or on behalf of the Government of Ghana (‘GoG’) play a key role in securing resources for national development, managing the economy, and structuring Ghana’s relations with other countries. Concerns have frequently been raised, however, about the opacity surrounding the negotiation of these agreements, their fairness or value for money. Parliament, which must by law approve these Executive-initiated agreements before they can bind the State, has been criticised for failing in its duty to subject these agreements to diligent and independent scrutiny. On its part, the Supreme Court has been blamed for compounding the problem with its decision in Felix Klomega (No.2) v Attorney General, Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority, Meridian Port Holdings Limited and Meridian Port Services Ltd where it held that for the purposes of parliamentary scrutiny of public agreements, the word ‘government’ as used in article 181 of the 1992 Constitution does not include State corporate entities. Therefore, agreements and transactions entered into by such State entities need not undergo or receive parliamentary scrutiny and approval. The holding that subjecting such agreements to parliamentary scrutiny would overburden Parliament is disturbing. It effectively creates a window for the central government to enter into transactions with varied financial implications, using state entities as conduits; thereby circumventing accountability mechanisms established by the Constitution. This paper examines the Court’s decision in Klomega and its implications for public financial management and accountability.
Originally published by the Ghana School of Law Journal, VI
